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SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
--0000000--
RAY M. HARDING, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18,031 
ALPINE CITY, 
Defendant/Appelant, 
--0000000--
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
--0000000--
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case concerns whether or not an existing Alpine 
City Sewer Connection Ordinance is an ultra vires act. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court ruled that the Alpine City Sewer 
Connection Ordinance is an ultra vires act and awarded Summary 
Judgment to Respondent on September 30, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to 
affirm the Summary Judgment entered by the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The presently existing Alpine City Sewer C6nnection ;-
Ordinance provides for mandatory sewer connection,of all 
1 
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buildings located on property within 500 feet of an existing 
sewer line. The Respondent's property lies approximately 365 
feet from an existing sewer line. Therefore, under the Alpine 
City Ordinance the Respondent is required to connect to the sewer 
line. Pursuant to the Ordinance, Respondent was assessed a sewer 
connection fee in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($1,500.00). Each month Alpine City sends Respondent a billing 
in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR AND N0/100 
DOLLARS ($1,464.00), the remaining amount due on the sewer 
connection fee assessed against the Respondent. 
In this action, the Respondent filed a Complaint 
alleging the above facts and asserting that Alpine City is 
without authority to provide for mandatory hookups for any 
building located on property more than 300 feet from an existing 
sewer line. Respondent also sought an Order of the Court 
determining~that Appellant may not assess Respon9ent a sewer 
connection fee. Appellant filed an Answer alleging it had 
authority to enact and enforce the Ordinance, and counterclaimed 
for an Order requiring Respondent to pay the remaining amount due 
on the sewer connection fee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN THE.INSTANT CASE 
2 
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It is clear that under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Summary Judgment may be rendered forthwith when 
appropriate. As stated: 
• the judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
The Respondent in the instant case has been awarded 
Summary Judgment by complying with the above rule. All 
reasonable factual inferences leave no genuine issue in dispute 
and disclose no triable issue of fact. The Judgment should 
therefore be affirmed to promote the prompt administration of 
justice. As noted in National American Life Ins. Co. vs. Bayou 
Country Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965): 
The rules permitting summary judgments should 
not be enlarged by construction yet it should 
be liberally interpreted to effectuate their 
purpose, to effect the prompt administration 
of justice, and to expedite litigation by 
avoiding needless trials where no triable 
issue of fact is disclosed. 
Id., 403 P.2d at 29. The proposition that Summary Judgment is 
proper when there are no material factual issues in dispute is 
well established. See, among others, Rich vs. McGovern, 551 P2d 
1266 (Utah 1976); Trans America Ins. Co. vs. United Resources, 
Inc. 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P2d 165 (1970); Leininger vs. 
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33(1965); and 
Foster vs. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967). 
3 
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Appellant quotes Controlled Receivables Inc. vs. 
Harmon, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966) in arguing that the 
trial court must consider all relevant facts and the reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the parties against whom 
the motion is made, and that Summary Judgment is a harsh measure. 
This argument is disputed by the Utah Supreme Court in the later 
case, Burningham vs. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974). After the 
plaintiff in that case lost a Summary Judgment, the Court stated: 
"Plaintiff says the case should be decided 
under the rules that (1) The evidence should 
be viewed in a light favorable to the 
Plaintiff and (2) A Summary Judgment 
is a harsh rule. He is not correct in 
either claim. In Summary Judgments, 
evidence is not to be viewed. The 
Judgment can be given only in case 
there is no dispute on a material 
evidentuary matter. We do not see that 
it is a harsh rule to tell a party that 
he is or is not entitled to recover as a 
matter of law when the facts are not in 
dispute." 
Id., 525 P.2d at 621. 
In the instant case, there are no material issues of 
fact. The Appellant's brief argues that the Court should have 
received evidence as to the reasonableness of the sewer 
connection requirement. However, the Court determined that the 
City did not have authority to require connection of buildings on 
property more than 300 feet from an existing sewer line. 
Therefore, the issue of whether or not the connection requirement 
4 
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was reasonable is immaterial and should not bar a grant of 
Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
THE ENACTMENT OF THE ALPINE CITY SEWER CONNECTION 
ORDINANCE WAS AN ULTRA VIRES ACT ON PART OF THE APPELLANT AND, 
THEREFORE, SUCH ORDINANCE IS UNLAWFUL AND VOID. 
Traditionally, Courts have strictly construed all 
delegations of power from states to local governments. This rule 
of strict construction is known as the Dillon Rule. A local 
government had no authority to act in any area unless it was 
specifically and explicitly given authority by the state 
legislature. However, in recent years most states, (including 
Utah) have relaxed this rule of strict construction. See cases 
cited by Appellant, State v. Hutchinson, No. 16087, (S. Ct. Utah, 
filed Dec. 9, 1980); John Call and Clark Jenkins v. City of West 
Jordan, No~ 15908 (S. Ct. Utah, filed Dec. 26, 1979); and Rupp v. 
Grantsville, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980). Local units of government 
are no longer governed by the Dillon Rule and may enact 
ordinances under general welfare grants such as that contained in 
the Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-84, 1953, as amended. 
However, in rejecting the rule of strict construction, 
the Court did recognize that there are still limitations on the 
authority of local governments acting under broad welfare 
clauses. In Hutchinson, supra, the Court stated: 
5 
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• . • local governments are without authority 
to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in 
conflict with, state statutory law. Salt Lake 
City vs. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 
(1968). Also an ordinance is invalid if it 
intrudes upon an area which the legislature 
has pre-empted by comprehensive legislation 
intended to blanket a particular field. 
Hutchinson, supra, pg. 90. In 1981 the Utah Supreme Court in 
Redwood Gym vs. Salt Lake County Commission, No. 16833 (Utah 
1981) again declared, "This Court has previously ruled that local 
governments may legislate by ordinance in areas previously dealt 
with by state legislation, provided the ordinance in no way 
conflicts with existing state law ••• ",Id., at 1144. See also 
' Salt Lake City vs. Howe, 106 P705 (Utah.1910); and Salt Lake City 
vs. Kusse, 93 P2d 671 (Utah 1938). 
As a further limitation the Court in Hutchinson stated 
that "specific grants of authority may serve to limit the means 
available under the general welfare clause, for some limitation 
may be imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use of 
power in a particular manner." Hutchinson, supra, at 95. Thus, 
local governments can rely on broad general w(•lfare clauses for 
authority to enact ordinances not specifically authorized by the 
legislature. But the broad exercise of authority is limited in 
the following specific instances: 
1. When the ordinance is prohibited by state statute. 
6 
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2. When the ordinance is in conflict with the state 
statute. 
3. Where a state statute directs the use of a power in 
a particular manner. 
4. Where the ordinance involves an area which has been 
pre-empted by comprehensive state legislation. 
In the instant case, Alpine City has enacted an 
ordinance requiring hookup of all buildings located within 500 
feet of an existing city sewer line. It. claims authority for so 
doing under a broad general grant of power to enact ordinances 
for the health, welfare, and safety of the city residents. 
However, in this particular case, most of the limitations set 
~ forth above should apply and prevent the city from enforcing its 
ordinance. Section 10-8-38 of the Utah code specifically directs 
that a city may ". provide for mandatory hookup where the 
sewer is available and within 300 feet of any property line .. 
The 300 foot distance is a limit on the city's authority. The 
state legislature has specifically directed the city how to 
exercise its authority and any ordinance which requires a hookup 
of buildings at a distance greater than 300 feet is clearly in 
conflict with the state statute. Furthermore, Section 10-8-38 
pre-empts the field of requiring connection to municipal sewer 
lines. ·The statute deals with what buildings can be required to 
connect, what charge can be made for the connection, and how the 
mandatory hookup can be enforced. Therefore, even in light of 
7 
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the new Utah Supreme Court decisions rejecting the strict 
construction of the Dillon Rule, the ordinance enacted by Alpine 
City is clearing ultra vires and consequently unlawful and void. 
If the Alpine City ordinance is allowed to stand, then the 
limitations set forth in the Hutchinson decision have no meaning 
at all. 
The Appellant urges that the use of the word "may" in 
Section 10-8-38 indicates that a municipality is not bound by the 
300 foot limit set forth therein. However, Appellant clearly 
misconstrues the statute. If a municipality can increase the 300 
foot limit to a 500 foot limit (or any other limit) in its 
discretion, then the 300 foot requirement in Section 10-8-38 can 
serve no purpose whatsoever. Including the term "300 feet" in 
the statute would be a waste of time since it would have no 
meaning. The only reasonable explanation is that the legislature 
intended to give municipalities a power to require sewer 
connections but also intended to limit that power to buildings 
located on property within 300 feet of an existing sewer line. 
The word "may" simply gives the municipality the discretion to 
require sewer hookup of buildings on property within the 300 foot 
limit. Appellant also quotes McQuillin On Municipal Corporations 
as support for the idea that a municipality has an inherent right 
under its police power to compel property owners to make 
connection with the sewer within a reasonable distance when the 
8 
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ot 
nt 
public health requires it. However, McQuillin also states the 
following: 
" •.. the operation of a sewer system has 
been said to be a matter of state-wide concern 
and, where the state legislature has entered 
the field, any attempt of a city to deal 
therewith except in strict accordance with 
the statutes covering the subject would be 
without force and effect." (Emphasis added) 
McQuillin On Municipal Corporations, Third Edition Revised, 
Volume II, at Section 31-lOA. 
CONCLUSION 
The material facts in this case are without dispute. 
They clearly show that the Alpine City ordinance is outside of 
the city's authority and therefore constitutes an ultra vires 
act. Accordingly, the Summary Judgment granted in favor of the 
Plaintiff by the District Court below should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2'J. 41/-l:ay of February, 
1982. 
American 
756-7658 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing Brief to John C. Backlund, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, 350 East Center Street, Provo, Utah 84601, 
postage prepaid, this c2:Jnr{ day of February, 1982 . 
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